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Trading and Pricing in Upstairs and Downstairs Stock Markets
This paper provides empirical evidence on the economic benefits of negotiating trades in the upstairs trading room of brokerage firms relative to the downstairs market. Using data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange, we find that upstairs trades tend to have lower information content and lower price impacts than downstairs trades. This is consistent with the hypotheses that the upstairs market is better at pricing uninformed liquidity trades and that upstairs brokers can give better prices to their customers if they know the unexpressed demands of other customers. We also find that the economic benefits of upstairs trades depend on price discovery occurring in the downstairs market.
It is common for an individual stock to be traded in more than one market. One way for this to occur is for a stock to be traded not only in its main (home) market but also in one or more regional or foreign markets. Another way is for a stock to be traded in upstairs and downstairs markets. The upstairs market is an off-exchange market where buyers and sellers negotiate in the "upstairs" trading rooms of brokerage firms. The downstairs market is the exchange floor or its electronic counterpart. In the latter venue the trades take place anonymously.
The nature of the relationships among multiple markets has recently attracted the attention of practitioners and academicians. Examples of studies examining main vs. other markets include Harris et al. (1995) , Hasbrouck (1995) and Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1996) , to name but a few of the more recent. Studies that explicitly investigate the relationships between upstairs and downstairs markets, however, are virtually nonexistent, with Madhavan and Cheng (1997) being a notable exception. They use the Consolidated Audit Trail Data (CAUD) files maintained by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and an indirect algorithm to classify upstairs and downstairs trades. Analyzing block trades of the Dow Jones stocks for a 30-day 2 period, Madhavan and Cheng (1997) report that the expected price impacts for orders over roughly 20,000 shares are smaller for upstairs than for downstairs trades. Their results are consistent with Seppi (1990) who hypothesizes that directly negotiated upstairs trades have lower adverse information costs than downstairs trades and with Grossman's (1992) conjecture that an upstairs broker/dealer can give a selling customer a better price than prevails downstairs if he knows an interested buyer.
The purpose of this study is to provide new evidence on trading activities and pricing mechanisms of upstairs and downstairs markets. The Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE) is analyzed because its upstairs market is formally organized and details (including the market in which a trade originated) for all trades must be reported to the HSE in a timely manner. The HSE downstairs market is electronic and trade information is reported in real time. These transaction data permit us to investigate the permanent and temporary price effects of trades on upstairs and downstairs markets. They also permit us to examine each market's contribution to price discovery. This is accomplished using common factor autoregression, a framework that explicitly recognizes that a stock's upstairs and downstairs prices share its fundamentals.
We add to the literature in three ways. First, for the 20 highest volume HSE stocks we examine the permanent and temporary price effects of all upstairs and downstairs trades.
Similar to the U.S. findings by Madhavan and Cheng (1997) , we find that upstairs trades are typically larger than the downstairs trades and that the former tend to have lower permanent and total price effects. Second, we show that the benefit of upstairs uninformed trading is associated with price discovery in the downstairs market. Our findings suggest that brokers tend to use the downstairs price as the basis for pricing upstairs trades and that the upstairs price has little effect 3 on the pricing of downstairs trades. Third, because the HSE data allow us to identify the brokers on both sides of the transaction, we can provide a more detailed analysis of upstairs trades than previous empirical studies. The results suggest that brokers tend to internalize upstairs trades, which is consistent with Grossman's (1992) notion that upstairs brokers are aware of the unexpressed demands of their own customers. Internalized trading may also be due to upstairs traders not wanting to contact other brokers because doing so exposes them to front running.
This study is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly describes the operations of the HSE upstairs and downstairs markets. Section 2 discusses the sample data used in the study. Section 3 presents the empirical evidence on the price impact differences between upstairs and downstairs trades. Section 4 examines the price discovery process linking the upstairs and downstairs markets. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
The Helsinki Stock Exchange
The HSE is a small market that expanded rapidly subsequent to its adoption of an automated trading and information system, HETI (Helsinki Stock Exchange Automated Trading and Information Systems).
1 Established in 1989 and fully operational by April 1990, HETI resembles with some minor differences the Continuous Automated Trading System (CATS) system used in many markets, including the Toronto, Paris, Brussels and Barcelona exchanges.
HETI is an electronic network without designated market makers. Limit order traders specify bid and offer prices through authorized brokerage firms, and these orders are continuously and anonymously matched during the free trading session from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 2 The tick size is determined by a step function scheme that categorizes stocks into four price bins. For all but the few stocks in the highest price category, the relative tick size evaluated at the price midpoint is 0.18%.
3
Orders can also be matched upstairs in the office of an authorized brokerage firm (20 at the end of 1995), which then reports the trades to HETI in a timely manner. For these orders, the brokerage firm searches for counterparties and negotiates prices. Usually, when a broker gets a large order (almost always by phone), it is not immediately put it into HETI. Rather, all other brokers in the room are informed that an order has been received. These brokers may either actively try to find counterparties among their own customers or passively wait for counterparties to arrive so that a transaction can be done in house. One reason for keeping the order in house is that submitting a large order to HETI could create an order imbalance and result in a large price impact in the downstairs market. Another reason is that because of potential front running, the brokerage firm does not want to inform its competitors and, in turn, their customers that it has a large order. Nevertheless, if the downstairs market's depth is substantial and the customer's desired price is close to the best prevailing bid or ask prices, the broker may send the large order directly to the downstairs market.
Customers can choose their trading venue. Traders with large orders, who fear their orders may have a significant impact on prices in the downstairs market, may request that their orders be processed in the upstairs market. Conversely, traders who prefer a prompt and anonymous transaction may request their orders be matched in the downstairs market. When brokers receive orders from customers not specifying the market to be used, brokers have the discretion to send the orders downstairs or to process them upstairs. However, according to the rules set up by the Financial Supervision Authority, which functions as an independent body and 5 together with the Bank of Finland oversees the operation of the HSE, brokers are not allowed to make an upstairs trade at a price that would not be the best price for the customer. This price is the broker's estimate of the best price available for the trade in any marketplace. 4 The broker's commission depends on the size of the trade, not its location.
The Sample Data
At the end of 1995, 73 firms were listed on the HSE, with the market value of FIM (Finnish markka) 191 billion. Since the HSE is a relatively thinly traded market, we select the HEX-20 stocks (as of the end of 1995) to ensure enough upstairs and downstairs observations for analysis in the three-year sample period from January 1993 through December 1995. The HEX-20 index is constructed by the HSE and consists of the 20 most actively traded stocks in terms of markka. The index comes up for review twice a year (January and July), although its composition did not change during the sample period. The sample includes all downstairs round-lot trades and upstairs trades in the free-trading session. In contrast, for the largest trade size group, about 85% of markka volumes (83% of share volumes) are conducted in the upstairs market, suggesting that large orders are more likely to be processed upstairs. 7 These numbers are much higher than the corresponding numbers in the U.S.
market. For example, Madhavan and Cheng (1997) show that, for the Dow Jones 30 stocks, only about 28% of large block trades with more than 50,000 shares are facilitated upstairs. Similarly, Hasbrouck, Sofianos, and Sosebee (1993) report that only about 27% of the block volume in all NYSE-listed stocks is conducted upstairs. Relative to the NYSE, the HSE is a thin market in which a trader may be afraid of a large price impact caused by a large trade. Therefore, it is plausible that the upstairs market plays a more important role in providing liquidity for large trades when the downstairs market is relatively thinly traded. Grossman's (1992) notion that upstairs brokers are information repositories for their customers' unexpressed demands.
Internalization may also occur because the brokers may not want to contact other brokers because doing so exposes them to front running or because they are acting as dealers who execute buys at the market offer and sells at the market bid, thereby pocketing the spread. Conversely, most of downstairs trades are cross-broker trades. This is to be expected because of the anonymous nature of downstairs trading. These results contrast the brokers' roles in the two markets. While the HETI system matches buys and sells and determines prices without the brokers' direct involvement in the downstairs market, brokers in the upstairs market need to search for customers and engage in price negotiation. Does the upstairs search-brokerage mechanism result in prices different from those produced by the downstairs anonymous exchange market in Finland? We provide an answer to this question in the section that follows.
Price Effects of Upstairs and Downstairs Trades
To assess whether there is differential pricing between the upstairs and downstairs markets, we compare the permanent, temporary, and total price effects of trades in the two markets. These effects are measured using conventional price impact analysis (see, e.g., Mayers (1987, 1990) and Keim and Madhavan (1996) ). The 8 permanent price effect of a trade presumably reflects a change in value resulting from new information conveyed by the trade. The temporary price effect measures the extent of price reversal following the trade. It is a transitory effect usually resulting from the existence of the bid-ask spread, which compensates liquidity providers. The total price effect of a trade reflects the extent of price concession, i.e., the difference between the trade price and the previous price, needed to absorb the trade in the market. Seppi (1990) argues that uninformed traders are more likely to go upstairs for direct negotiation, implying that upstairs trades should convey less information and hence have a smaller permanent price effect than downstairs trades. The upstairs search-brokerage mechanism suggests that the temporary price effect, which is needed to induce counterparties to trade, should be larger for upstairs trades than for downstairs trades. According to his model, uninformed traders are better off transacting upstairs than downstairs, implying that the total price effect should be smaller in the upstairs market. That is, the reduction in the adverse information cost should outweigh the added liquidity cost in the upstairs market. Similarly, Grossman (1992) argues that the function of information repositories allows brokers to give upstairs customers a better price than prevails downstairs. Therefore, his model also implies a smaller total price effect for upstairs trades than for downstairs trades. A smaller total price effect, however, does not mean that the upstairs market is better and more cost effective than the downstairs market for all investors. As Seppi (1990) to the previous trade (zero-tick), the trade is excluded. Lee and Ready (1991) and Aitken and Frino (1996) suggest that the tick rule is a reasonably accurate method to classify trades as buyerinitiated or seller-initiated if zero-tick trades are ignored.
Denote p t , p t!j , and p t+s as the logarithms of the transaction (up-tick or down-tick) price of the trade at time t, the price of the j th trade before the trade at time t, and the price of the s th trade after the trade at time t, respectively. 9 We assume that p t-j serves as the equilibrium price before the trade at time t and p t+s the equilibrium price after the trade at time t. The permanent price effect of the trade at time t then is p t+s !p t!j ; the temporary price effect is p t !p t+s ; and the total price effect is p t !p t-j . The choice of j and s depends on the extent of possible information leakage before a trade and a possible delay in the market's response to the trade. We choose j=5
and s=3 based on a trade-by-trade analysis. On average, we find no significant price movements 5 trades before and 3 trades after a trade.
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Trade-by-trade price movements around large upstairs and downstairs trades are shown in Figure 1 for down-tick trades and in Figure 2 for up-tick trades, large trades being those whose sizes are equal to or exceed the 95 th percentile of all trades in a sample firm. Other trade size groups have similar trade-by-trade price movements. These figures reveal that there are substantial reactions to both down-tick and up-tick trades but that these reactions display noticeable intermarket differences. For instance, for both up-tick and down-tick trades, the price change occurs in the downstairs market only at the time of the trade. Although these trade price changes are evident in the upstairs market, there are also noticeable price movements before and after the trade. For up-tick (down-tick) trades the price decreases (increases) immediately prior to and after the trade. The latter reaction is consistent with a liquidity or temporary price effect.
The former may reflect the trade being anticipated.
11 Table 3 For up-tick trades, on average, the permanent price effects are positive, implying that buyer-initiated trades tend to contain favorable information. The mean permanent price effect for downstairs up-tick trades is about 62 basis points and is about 15 basis points for upstairs up-tick trades. 13 The difference is statistically significant for the whole sample as well as for each of the five trade size groups. Thus, for both down-tick and up-tick trades, the results imply that upstairs trades tend to be less information-motivated than downstairs trades.
However, on average, the magnitude of the temporary price effect is significantly larger for upstairs trades than for downstairs trades. For down-tick trades, the mean temporary price effect of upstairs trades is about 27 basis points, and is about five basis points for downstairs trades. Similarly, for up-tick trades, the mean temporary price effect of upstairs trades is about 20 basis points, and is about seven basis points for downstairs trades. On the face of it, these results indicate that there is a larger price reversal following upstairs trades than downstairs trades. The price reversal following large upstairs trades is evident in Figures 1 and 2 , but is absent for large downstairs trades. 14 However, the results may, in part, reflect the fact that very often large trades are executed in the upstairs market when quotes are not deep and the limit orders satisfied.
Nevertheless, on average, downstairs trades have a significantly larger price impact than upstairs trades. For the down-tick sample, the mean total price effect is about 68 basis points for downstairs trades vs. 37 basis points for upstairs trades. For the up-tick sample, it is about 69 basis points for downstairs trades vs. 35 basis points for upstairs trades. Therefore, on average, upstairs traders appear to be able to obtain roughly 30 basis points better execution than downstairs traders.
The pricing differences between the upstairs and downstairs markets in Finland is larger than those in U.S., as documented by Madhavan and Cheng (1997) . According to their analysis, the difference in the mean total price effect between upstairs and downstairs trades in the U.S. is no more than two basis points. This small pricing difference may be partially due to a NYSE regulation, which requires that an upstairs trade has to be exposed to the public in the downstairs market, as opposed to Finland's "best price" rule. That is, brokers, who arrange an upstairs trade, must offer other investors an opportunity to trade in accordance with price and time priority auction principles, and permit either side of the upstairs trade to obtain possible price improvement. Thus, when negotiating a price for the upstairs trade, brokers take possible participation of downstairs traders into consideration. This enforced downstairs participation may narrow the price difference between the two U.S. markets.
Differential pricing between the upstairs and downstairs markets may also depend on the market thinness. The sample HSE stocks are much more thinly traded than the Dow Jones 30 stocks in Madhavan and Cheng's (1997) sample. Actively traded stocks tend to have many buyers and sellers standing ready to trade, which creates great market depth even for large trades in the downstairs market. Consequently, differential pricing between the upstairs and downstairs markets may be trivial for very actively traded stocks. 
Price Discovery in Upstairs and Downstairs Markets
The price impact analysis for individual trades conducted in the above section allows us to estimate the extent of differential pricing between the upstairs and downstairs markets.
However, the method cannot be used to analyze how the pricing for the same security in the two markets may interact. We need a model to further enhance our understanding of what functions the two markets may provide and how they interact. In particular, we would like to know whether the benefit to uninformed traders of the upstairs market, documented in Table 3 , depends in part on price discovery in the downstairs market. The downstairs market matches public demands for and supplies of shares and determines a clearing price at a given point in time.
Brokers in the upstairs market may use the price information provided from the downstairs 13 market to set the price schedule. Conversely, the trading activity in the upstairs market may affect the clearing price in the downstairs market. In this section, we use a simple pricing model to show where price discovery occurs and how the two markets interact.
The econometric framework underpinning our price discovery measures is a vector error correction model (VECM). These models are often used to study the interactions between the prices of two or more assets because they are able to capture the phenomenon that the prices of similar assets generally do not drift away from each other for extended periods. The list of VECM applications is extensive and is growing. For a survey of early work, see Brenner and Kroner (1995) . More recent examples are found throughout the current literature and are too numerous to mention here.
Because price discovery is an economic concept and not a statistical one, our analysis also requires a market microstructure model that spells out how the upstairs and downstairs markets react to news. A caveat is necessary at this point. As Hasbrouck (1996) cogently points out, a VECM is a very flexible specification and is capable of representing various microstructure schemes. This means that, Friedman's logical positivism aside, the acceptability of VECMbased price discovery findings rests on the plausibility of the underlying microstructure model.
A simple pricing model
Our microstructure model rests on the work of many others, with the primary building blocks being Amihud and Mendelson (1987) , Glosten (1987) and Hasbrouck (1996, p. 684) . As a result we posit the following pricing relationships: m t = m t-1 + u 1, t + u 2, t + w t (1)
Equations (1) through (3) are pricing specifications for the efficient price (m t ), the upstairs market price (p 1, t ), and the downstairs market price (p 2, t ) for a single stock in period t. As in section 3, the p i,t are transaction prices. The remaining terms represent innovations that are associated with information arrival. Innovation w t depicts updates to the public information set.
In contrast, innovations u 1,t (u 2,t ) portray the private information revealed through trading in the upstairs (downstairs) market. It is convenient to think of trade innovations to be comprised of two parts (u i,t = g i,t x i,t The model is interpreted in the following manner. Innovations u 1, t and u 2, t occur only in their respective market, but w t occurs in both the upstairs and downstairs markets. The three innovations are immediately priced in the efficient market so that the efficient price is a martingale. Innovation w t is immediately priced by the upstairs and downstairs markets.
However, although u 1,t (u 2,t ) is immediately priced by the upstairs (downstairs) market, only a portion, 1!b 2 (1!b 1 ), of it is immediately priced by the downstairs (upstairs) market. Moreover, we permit the portion of u i,t not being immediately priced to be the same in each of the subsequent periods. Thus, an alternative interpretation of b i is that they measure the speed at which the upstairs and downstairs prices approach the efficient price.
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Since we are using transactions data, we define price discovery to be the process by which the upstairs and downstairs prices approach (or in the extreme become equal to) the efficient price. 20 In the context of the above microstructure model, there are two factors that determine the nature of this process. The first is the magnitude of b i . Ceteris paribus, the smaller the portion of the innovations not immediately priced (b i ), the quicker the transaction prices converge to the efficient price. 21 If, for example, b 2 in equation (3) is zero, the downstairs price converges instantaneously to the efficient price. In other words, the downstairs price is the efficient price. The second factor is the relative magnitude of the innovations. If one market's unique innovations are typically larger in absolute terms than those of the other market, the first market's price evolves more like the efficient price than the second market's price. Again, at the extreme, if trades in the upstairs market never reveal any information, i.e., u l,t is always zero, the downstairs price evolves via only public information and information from downstairs trades while the upstairs price converges to the downstairs price. Moreover, the larger w t is relative to u i, t , the more that the time series behaviors of the upstairs and downstairs prices resemble that of the efficient price.
A VECM representation
Thus, to evaluate empirically the price discovery functions of the upstairs and downstairs markets, it is necessary to measure b i , u i, t and w t . Unfortunately, neither they nor the efficient price are directly observable, making it necessary to recast our microstructure model to contain only the observable upstairs and downstairs prices. Relying on the model's implication that the upstairs and downstairs prices are cointegrated and employing some tedious algebra, equations
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(1) through (3) may be recast into the following vector error correction model (VECM) with k lags: numbers, z t-1 = (p 1, t-1 ! p 2, t-1 ) is the error correction term, the C j 's are 2x2 matrices of parameters, and E t = (e 1,t , e 2,t )0 is a zero mean vector of serially uncorrelated errors with covariance matrix:
The term ( ) is the variance of e 1, t (e 2, t ) and is the correlation between e 1, t and e 2, t . different. In the VECM, the upstairs and downstairs prices are modeled so that they converge to each other rather than individually approach the efficient price. Thus, the speed of price adjustment is relative to each other, with the larger and not the smaller magnitude b i being associated with the faster convergence speed. To clarify this assertion, let us return to the example where b 2 equals zero. In this case the downstairs price does not adjust (i.e., its speed of adjustment is zero) to the upstairs price because it is the efficient price. If b 1 is not zero, the upstairs price adjusts to the downstairs price. The second part, EC j )P t-j , depicts the short-run dynamics between the upstairs and downstairs prices. These effects work in conjunction with the error correction coefficients to permit both prices to approach the efficient price. Without them the upstairs and downstairs prices would converge with no guarantee that their equilibrium value is the efficient price. The final part, (e 1,t , e 2,t ), shows the innovations resulting from information being made public and from information being revealed through trading. The e i,t are complicated moving averages involving b i , u i,t and w t . It is not possible to disentangle e i,t to determine the values for the microstructure model's innovations because taken together e i,t in this regard are underidentified.
Price discovery measures
Using the estimation results from the VECM, we employ the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor and Hasbrouck (1995) information share methods to explore the price discovery implications of our microstructure model. The crux of both methods is that they decompose the impact of an innovation into permanent and temporary components in a framework analogous to Stock and Watson (1988) and allocate the permanent component to, in our case, the upstairs and downstairs markets. The permanent effects are associated with information, while the transitory effects are related to market phenomena such as the bid-ask bounce, price discreteness, inventory adjustments and the like. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) base their decomposition solely on the error correction coefficients. Hasbrouck (1995) , however, recasts his VECM into a vector moving average representation and concentrates on the parameters of the innovations. Although seemingly different, Baillie et al. (2000) show that both price discovery metrics are derived from the orthogonal of the error correction coefficient vector and may provide qualitatively similar results.
In our context, the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) definition is equivalent to considering the common factor to be the price of a portfolio containing one stock with some of the shares purchased in the upstairs market and some in the downstairs markets, with serving as portfolio weights. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) show that is i γ i γ orthogonal to b i , the error correction coefficients. Thus, standardizing these weights so that they sum to one permits the contribution of the i th market's permanent components of its innovations to the common factor to be specified as: factor is derived solely from the upstairs price, while H2 asserts that the common factor is derived solely from the downstairs price. In other words, H2 implies that brokers use the downstairs price as the basis for pricing upstairs trades and H1 implies the opposite. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) , building on the work of Johansen (1991) , develop a log-likelihood to test H1 and H2 separately.
Following a somewhat different tack than Gonzalo and Granger (1995), Hasbrouck (1995) decomposes the common factor innovations and defines a market's information share to be the proportional contribution of its innovations to the variance of the innovations in all markets. In the absence of contemporaneous correlation of the market innovations, Baillie et al.
( 2000) and Martens (1998) show that for the two market case, Hasbrouck's (1995) According to our microstructure model, the intermarket innovations display some level of contemporaneous correlation. Following Hamilton (1994) , Hasbrouck (1995) suggests Cholesky factorization of = FF' to eliminate this correlation, which results in a triangular matrix version Ω of equation (5): ( (1 )). σ ρ − discrepancy can be substantial if the innovations are highly contemporaneously correlated, an empirical phenomenon not experienced by Hasbrouck (1995) who uses extremely high frequency (one second) data. 22 To provide a complete picture, therefore, it is necessary to consider sequentially the upstairs and downstairs prices as the first and second markets in the factorization. Unfortunately, Hasbrouck (1995) and others who have used his technique have not been able to construct a statistical significance test for these bounds. Our efforts in this regard 21 have also been unsuccessful. Thus, we follow Hasbrouck's (1995) suggestion and provide the cross-sectional standard error of these bounds for our 20 stocks as a measure of variation.
In sum, we use the models of Granger and Gonzalo (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) to assess the relative importance of the upstairs and downstairs markets' contributions to price discovery. If the non-anonymous upstairs market is better for uninformed traders and the anonymous downstairs market is at least as good for informed traders, we expect that price discovery should occur primarily but not necessarily solely in the downstairs market and that the results of our empirical tests should be closer to the hypothesis H2 than H1. Such a finding would be consistent with the results in section 3 that indicate that upstairs trades are less informative than downstairs trades.
Construction of price pairs
To properly test the hypotheses outlined above, it is necessary to pair a downstairs price with an upstairs price. We use the MINSPAN pairing procedure proposed by Harris et al. (1995) . Specifically, to form the first pair with the first trade from the second market, we consider two trades from the first market, one before and the other after the trade from the second market, and select the trade from the first market that occurs closer in time to the trade from the second market. The second pair and the pairs that follow are formed in the same manner. The 
Empirical results
In Table 4 we report the VECM estimation results for the error correction coefficients The Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor statistics given in Table 5 are derived from the VECM results in Table 4 . Turning first to the common factor statistics, the null hypothesis that the upstairs price is the only component of the common factor is rejected for all 20 stocks. However, the null hypothesis that However, as shown in equations (9.1) and (9.2), if one common factor weight value is one and the other is zero, the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and the Hasbrouck (1995) conclusions are the same. According to the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) test results, this is not the case for five stocks. Table 6 Overall, our price discovery results are consistent with Seppi's (1990) model which predicts that uninformed (institutional) traders prefer the upstairs market, while informed traders randomize (in equilibrium) their trades between the upstairs and downstairs markets. Hence, in some markets, the information content of upstairs trades would be trivial but in other markets it may not be. In any case, there should be more information revealed from trades in the downstairs market.
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the trading and pricing behavior of a security that is traded in upstairs and downstairs markets. Using data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange, we find that the permanent price effect of upstairs trades is significantly smaller, implying that information-motivated trades occur less in the upstairs market than in the downstairs market. Conversely, the temporary price effect is significantly larger in the upstairs market, suggesting that liquidity providers require a higher compensation in the upstairs market.
The total price effect is significantly smaller for upstairs trades than for downstairs trades. The results are consistent with Seppi's (1990) hypothesis that the upstairs market is better in pricing (institutional) uninformed liquidity trades. The results also are consistent with Grossman's 25 (1992) hypothesis that upstairs brokers can give better prices for their customers when they know the unexpressed demands of their customers.
Our common factor analysis supports the conclusions drawn from the price impact findings. For most sample firms, the downstairs price reveals the common factor by impounding trade and other information. Consequently, brokers largely use the downstairs price plus a transitory component as the basis for pricing upstairs trades. This price discovery function of the downstairs market reflects the permanent (temporary) effect in the upstairs market being smaller (larger) than the permanent (temporary) effect of the downstairs market.
Our empirical evidence of differential pricing between the upstairs and downstairs markets has an important practical implication for international investors. Because of the globalization of investing, international fund managers need to know the pricing practices and the liquidity of international upstairs and downstairs markets when making investment decisions.
We find that, taken as a whole, the upstairs market is more beneficial for uninformed traders and the downstairs anonymous market is more advantageous for informed traders to camouflage their trades. As a result, most of price discovery occurs in the downstairs market, upon which the upstairs market relies. It is likely that this phenomenon characterizes other relatively thin markets as well. 2 Before the free trading session, there is a pre-trading session. In the first phase of pre-trading from 8:30 a.m. -9:50 a.m., traders submit bid and offer prices. In the second phase from 9:50 a.m. -10:00 a.m., HETI matches suitable orders into transactions and transfers the remaining orders to the free-trading session. The purpose of pre-trading is to determine the quotation and trading level for each stock exchange security for free trading. After the free-trading session, there are two after-market trading sessions: 5:05 p.m. -6:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. -8:25 a.m. the next day. In these sessions, trades must be executed inside the maximum price range bounded by the continuous trading session's closing bid-ask spread such that if the trading day's high (low) transactions price is above (below) the closing ask (bid), that transactions price defines the upper (lower) bound.
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9 We pool together upstairs and downstairs trades in sequence of their occurring time. Hence, for an upstairs trade at time t, the trade at t-j or t+s could be a downstairs trade and vice versa. 10 The mean (median) of the average time between any two consecutive intraday trades on a sample firm is 16 minutes (14 minutes). Hence, the mean intraday time span for five trades is about 80 minutes, and is about 48 minutes for a 3 -trade interval.
11 An alternate but less satisfying explanation is that it may be the result of misclassifications by the tick rule. Although the rule appears accurate for downstairs market, little is known concerning its accuracy in upstairs markets.
12 Our estimates of the price effects of trades could be affected by the fact that a large trade may be split into several smaller trades and are counted as separate trades. The HSE data available to us do not indicate whether a trade is a part of another trade; however, the brokerage firm identifications are available for each trade on both sides. Hence, if a trade is a part of another trade, both trades must have the same broker on at least one side of the transactions. To see how sensitive our estimates of the price effects are to regrouping together trades that occur very close in time, we recreate two sample sets of trades from the original trades. The first one puts together trades that occur within five minutes and by the same buyer broker; the second set groups by the same seller broker. When putting together a number of trades into an assembled trade, we use a share-weighted average price for the assembled trade. There are about 6.9% of the assembled trades that involve both upstairs and downstairs markets. Since we are comparing the price effects of trades in these two markets, we discard those mixed trades from our analysis.
The results based on regrouped data are essentially the same as those based on the original data. We also decreased the time interval between two consecutive trades from five minutes to one minute and increased it to ten minutes. We obtained virtually the same results, indicating that our results are robust and not sensitive to how trades are regrouped.
13 A permanent effect of approximately 60 basis points may seem large when compared to estimates obtained using U.S. data, but it is substantially smaller than the typical HEX stock bidask spread. Although data to calculate intraday spreads are not available. Booth et al. (2000) report that, for the same time period covered by this study, end-of-day spreads are typically 300 to 400 basis points for stocks with prices ranging from 10 to 1,000 markka.
14 It is surprising that there is no reversal in the data for the downstairs market of HSE, which is an open limit order book system. These results are inconsistent with theories of an open limit order book, which predict some reversal from transaction prices (see Glosten (1994) ).
28 16 In the downstairs market case, it may be helpful to consider the size of the impact parameter to be positively related to the bid-ask spread because this spread contains, among other things, an asymmetric information component. Viewing g 1, t in the same way is problematic. This is because the upstairs market broker/dealers do not provide quotes, although the menu of downstairs market limit orders is viewable in the upstairs trading rooms.
17 Alternatively x i t could be defined to be signed volume. Hasbrouck (1991) , however, reports that the indicator specification provides more consistent empirical estimates.
18 Although the individual innovations do not covary with each other, collectively the innovations in the upstairs and downstairs market will almost surely be correlated with each other because of the shared innovations. For instance, if we assume that the variances of w t , u 1t and u 2t are equal and b 1 and b 2 are 1.0 (0.0), the correlation between the collective innovations is 0.5 (1.0). If one b i is 1.0 and the other is 0.0, the correlation is 0.817.
19 Several different information-based explanations as to why the adjustment is not instantaneous have been given. For instance, Hong and Stein (1999) rely on the notion of bounded rationality and suggest that it is because that heterogeneous investors have different information sets that evolve over time. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishney (1998) hypothesize that investors have a conservative bias and do not quickly update their priors in response to new information. Finally, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) suggest that partial adjustments are a result of investors assessing and reacting to private and public information differently. 20 Other measures of price discovery involving bid and ask quotes are offered in the literature. For example, it may be argued that the frequency of quote revisions is positively related to the notion of price discovery. Investigating this and other quote related metrics is not possible in Finland because as indicated previously (see fn. 16) quotes are not provided in the upstairs market. Limit order prices, however, are available throughout the continuous trading session but only the closing bid and ask prices are retrieved and kept by the HSE (see fn. 2).
21 If 0 #b i < 1 , the convergence to the efficient price will be monotonic. If b i = 1, the price will be a martingale but not be the efficient price. If b i > 1, the price will diverge from the efficient price. The magnitudes of the b i depend on data frequency, with higher frequency data being associated with larger b i values than lower frequency data, ceteris paribus. matched with the most recent downstairs trades. Thus, the upstairs price may potentially contain more recent information than the downstairs price, creating a possible discovery bias for the upstairs market. The REPLACE ALL price discovery results are qualitatively the same as the MINSPAN findings, however. The 20 sample stocks are the stocks in the HEX-20 index in 1995. The summary statistics are based on trades occurring in the freetrading session during the sample period from January 1993 through December 1995. An in-house trade is a trade where the brokerage firm is the same on both sides of the transaction. A cross-broker trade involves different brokerage firms. This table provides the average percentage of markka volume and share volume in trade size group. The trade size cut-offs in each group are determined based on each firm's trade size distribution; thus they vary in absolute trade size across firms. The numbers reported in the table are averaging across the 20 sample firms during the sample period 1993-1995. In-house and cross-broker percentages represent their respective portion of the subtotal. The table presents mean temporary, permanent and total price effects of upstairs and downstairs trades in the HSE during the period three trades after. The permanent price effect is defined as p t+3 -p t-5 , where p t-5 is the log transaction price five trades before the trade at time t. The temporary price effect is p t -p t+3 , and the permanent price effect is p t -p t-5 . Using the t-statistic derived from the cross-section of 20 firms, the null hypothesis that the mean price effects are the same for the two markets is rejected in every case at the 0.1% significance level as denoted by †. Up and Down stand for the Upstairs and Downstairs markets,respectively. The trade size percentile cut-offs in each group are determined based on each firm's trade size distribution; thus they vary in absolute trade size across firms. The numbers reported in the table are averages across the 20 sample firms. White's (1990) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics to test the statistical significance of the coefficients, with the null hypothesis being that the coefficient equals zero. Superscripts † , # , and * denote significance at the 0.1%, 1.0% and 5.0% levels, respectively. The table also includes the variances of the innovations from equation (5) as well as the cross-market correlations of these innovations. Hasbrouck (1995) information shares for the upstairs and downstairs markets. The names of the five stocks for which the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) null hypothesis that the downstairs market is the sole source of the common factor is rejected are in boldface. The maximum (minimum) upstairs market contribution to the common factor's innovation is when the upstairs price is the first (second) variable in the Cholesky factorization. The downstairs market's contributions are similarly defined the maximum (minimum) contribution of the upstairs market and the minimum (maximum) of the downstairs market sum to one. This figure is constructed in the following manner. A large upstairs (or downstairs) trade (those in the highest five percentiles) with a downtick is designated as trade 0. The previous 10 trades (regardless of their trade locations, size and tick) prior to trade 0 are trades -1, -2 and so forth. The trades after trade 0 are 1, 2, ... and so on. Trade-to-trade returns (i.e., the differences in log prices) are calculated from trades -10 to trade +10. These returns are then averaged and cumulated. This figure is constructed in the following manner. A large upstairs (or downstairs) trade (those in the highest five percentiles) with a up-tick is designated as trade 0. The previous 10 trades (regardless of their trade locations, size and tick) prior to trade 0 are trades -1, -2 and so forth. The trades after trade 0 are 1, 2, ... and so on. Trade-to-trade returns (i.e., the differences in log prices) are calculated from trades -10 to trade +10. These returns are then averaged and cumulated.
